The Invasion of Normandy 1417, the siege of Honfleur

Figure 1: King Philip le Bel's shipyard at Rouen, with a fleet sailing on the Seine in the background. [1]

While searching for accounts in the original chronicles that describe the events of 1417 following the landing at Trouville, I have become aware of an intriguing inconsistency between the English and French accounts of the events that followed the landings.

Having recently visited many of the locations described, it became apparent to me that the English accounts have all overlooked, or played down a three week siege of Honfleur that took place in August 1417.

I believe that this reticence to discuss the siege was a conscious attempt to cover-up, what must have been a serious upset for King Henry and his officers at the time.

The successful defence of the port of Honfleur by the town's Armagnac defenders, may indeed have changed the course of the entire expedition, by forcing King Henry V to reconsider and to change the original objectives of his operations.

This collective overlooking of the events by the English chroniclers, has also I believe concealed a second phase of the naval operations in the Bay of the Seine in August 1417.

Figure 2: Honfleur Customs House, one of the few buildings thought to survive from before 1417.

Almost all the chronicles that refer to the landings in France in 1417, like Monstrelet or Gesta Quinti make only a passing reference to the later naval aspects of the operation following the actual landing in 1417.

In order to understand the strategic dilemmas that were presented to King Henry in 1417 by his possession of Harfleur, I believe that it is crucial to first understand the naval situation, before one can fully comprehend the later progress of the campaign in late August and September 1417.

By the spring of 1416 it had become clear that the capture of Harfleur in 1415 was the only tangible and lasting success that King Henry V could claim for the immense effort that the English had put into his attack on France besides the possession of a number of high profile French captives.

This effort had imposed a heavy burden on his kingdom, both in monetary terms through taxation and the raising of loans, and also from the losses of soldiers experienced at the siege of Harfleur.

Maintaining possession of Harfleur was becoming an increasing serious problem for the King and his advisers, because if the garrison capitulated, even this victory would be lost.

The port was closely blockaded by French forces operating from Montvilliers monastery, and several other nearby fortified villages.  The main French siege headquarters at Montvilliers was located less than four kilometres from the walls at Harfleur.

Due to the critical shortages of supplies inside Harfleur and the tightness of the blockade, the garrison were having to mount raids for supplies into the Pay de Caux, often riding out behind the French positions for  twenty or more kilometres away from their base.

However, by doing so they were running huge risks of being cut off upon their return into the town.

The hinterland controlled by the garrison of Harfleur was far too small to allow the town to be self-sufficient, and in any case, many of the former Norman inhabitants of the town had become refugees, or had died during the siege, leaving insufficient cultivators left to work the land.

If the King lost Harfleur, and there was every prospect of this occurring, it would mean that he would lose face and status by comparison to the French leaders, and this in turn might cause him to vital lose support back in England.

Although France was split by a vicious civil war, the outcome of the struggle between at Armagnacs and the Burgundians was uncertain, and at any moment one or other of the principle protagonists might succeed in overcoming his opponent, and then in combining France’s resources against the far less powerful English kingdom.

The shortage of supplies at Harfleur had become critical during 1416.  Sir John Skidmore and Reginald Courtoys, victuallers, along with others, were dispatched by the governor from Harfleur to the king on 6th April 1416 to bring him word of the towns increasingly desperate situation.[2]

To relieve the situation a major naval expedition had had to be mounted from Southampton under the command of the Duke of Bedford, the King’s brother with which to break the French naval blockade of the port of Harfleur. [3]

The French had had all the advantages in this contest because they had a very good naval base at Honfleur from which to operate from, located almost within sight of the beleaguered garrison at Harfleur just across the estuary, as well as from Rouen about 130km up upstream from where to support any attack on English shipping approaching Harfleur.

The outcome of the battle fought by the Duke of Bedford on the 15^th of August 1416, while nominally an English victory, which had enabled Harfleur to be replenished, had come at a high cost to the English in terms of ships sunk, and men lost.  Out of an English fleet originally believed to have numbered about 300 ships, about 20 ships and 700 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers had been either killed or seriously wounded.[4]

If one re-supply operation had required such a major effort, and had cost so many vessels and men, what would be the recurring cost of the future re-supply operations required to supply the garrison be?

How could he re-supply Harfleur several times every year in the face of what might become a steadily reinforced French naval presence at the mouth of the Seine?

How was the King to prevent his sole symbolic acquisition from falling to the French?

How could he do it without placing such a burden on the English economy and people that they might decide to change the regime?

As Craig Lambert [5] and Ian Friel show in their recent research, the organisation of King Henry V’s fleets both for the Harfleur and Agincourt Campaign in 1415, and also for the 1417 invasion were colossal feats of organisation, and ones that demonstrates that the King had developed an experienced and sophisticated staff, led by Richard Cliderowe and John Everdon, able to mobilise these fleets in the relatively short periods available.

The fleet in 1417 included 256 ships, of which 124 belonged to English owners or to the King.  The others were hired in mainly from the Low Countries.  This fleet was considerably smaller in numerical terms than the one used in 1415 when the King appears to have mobilised between 700 and 750 ships, and was smaller than some of the earlier fleets used by Edward III, whose fleets had numbered from between 300 ships and 450 ships for his Brittany expedition.

The 1417 invasion fleet had approximately 117 Nautical miles (135 miles) across which to sail, and were able to make the crossing in favourable weather in two days.

Lambert shows that the crews required to serve the ships would have exceeded the numbers of soldiers that the ships were transporting, requiring a ratio of approximately 1.2 sailors to each soldier carried.[6]

The average number of soldiers carried will have varied widely depending on the size of the vessel, but by dividing the number of men to be carried by the number of vessels we get an average of 18 to 20 soldiers per ship.

I am unable to find any indication of the numbers of horses that the expedition carried, however evidence collated by Lambert (2017) [7] shows that the numbers of horses carried on other expeditions substantially exceeded the numbers of men.  In 1415 the duke of York had taken 770 horses for a retinue of only 450 men.

Dukes were allowed 50 horses, earls, 24, barons 16, knights 6, esquires 4 and archers 1.  So that despite the fact that most of the soldiers would fight on foot, many had ponies to give them strategic mobility, and to carry supplies, equipment and things like tents for the most senior individuals.

The numbers of horses carried per ship depended on the size of ship, but seems to have ranged from 28 or 30, with 51 on one particularly large ship.  The Chronicles also state that in August 1417 the army had substantial quantities of siege engines like Sows [8], as well as cannon, all of which would need carrying across to France.

Although there were over 200 recognised ports around England in the medieval period, the ships in 1417 came from only 50 of these ports, situated along the south coast and as far north as the Humber. 

These ports included small fishing villages like Cromer, Sheringham, Wells-next-the Sea and Thornham.

The average size of English vessel used was only about 78 tonnes, while the average size for the hired in foreign vessels was surprisingly even lower at only 57 tons.

It appears that although there were larger English merchant vessels ranging between 200 and 300 tonnes in burden available that undertook important wine trade to Bordeaux, it appears that these ships were not taken up for service.  Lambert argues that this may have been to avoid disrupting the trade which brought in desperately needed monies from import duties for the Exchequer, and also to avoid potential for political issues with the powerful City merchant interests.

The mouth of the Seine has a complex set of shallow sand bars at its mouth, and as it was the King’s intention to land on open beaches, or to penetrate into the mouth of the river Seine, it would have made good sense to use smaller shallow draft ships, crewed by men accustomed to landing onto exposed open beaches, like those from North Norfolk, rather than it would be to risk larger cargo ships.

The account of the landing at Trouville in my earlier blog post is based on Monstrelet’s Chronicle, which is written from a Burgundian point of view, and by an author located at a considerable distance from the events it was describing.

There are several other chronicles which describe these events from both the English and French points of view.  It is really interesting to compare and contrast their accounts which are written with a view to promoting their patron’s status and to appeal to their partisan potential readers point of view.

The following account comes from an early English translation of Titus Livius chronicle Vita Henrici Quiniti, made into English from the original Latin in 1513, which gives us a description of these events from an English point of view. [9]

Because his journey shoulde not be knowne to his enemies nor where he intended to arive, the Kinge kept his purpose secret from his companie, except that to such persons as was his pleasure he disclosed his councell. And for that cause he had commaunded that all the rest of his nauy should followe those two shipps Royall, whithersoeuer they woulde sayle.

To all the nauy it pleased God to send a good and plesaunt lo winde, vntill the first day of August they all arryued in Normandy, not farr from the Castell of Tonque. Then the watches and guardes of the sea banks, and of the havens of that cuntry, at the first perceauinge so greate an navye, whose streinght they knewe themselues not able to resist, left there stations and fledd to saue theire lyues.

The Kinge w^th all his companie arriued and tooke land, where at his first landinge he dubbed 48 knights of his hoast, such as were able and worthie of that order; and that done he ordered to be pro- claymed all those ordynaunces and edicts that were published tofore the besieginge of Harefleet, and also diuers other such as he thought to be good and proffitable for his hoast. Not farr from the sea banke where he landed were smale and ruynate howses, wherein the Kinge wth diuers other his most familliar and his householde seruants were lodged for that night. And the residue of his hoast were lodged in there tents & pavillions. And when all the shipps were vnladen and discharged of theire carriage he sent againe all the navy into England, except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of warr.

And except also such shipps as the Kinge had assigned to the Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiett.

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur] and of other Castells, Townes and Citties nighe vnto those parts; w^th gentlemen, w^th manie prisoners and greate prayes of beastes, returned to the hoast in euerie thinge satisfied the Kings mynde, for as much as was there charge. There enemies assured of there comminge in so greate a number were all stricken w"" feare, everie man of them for himselfe conveyed there stufe, there beasts, theire graynes, and all other goods into Citties, Castells, and Townes, lo not knowinge whome the Kinge woulde first assiege. Then they prepared there holds, they strenghtened there Townes and walls w^th stones and gunns and other things necessarie.

The account fits well with that written by Monstrelet, but adds several intriguing details.  It describes the French coast watching organisation, and how the watchers fled, quite understandably given the scale of the fleet that was arriving on the tide.  The villagers at Trouville, evidently caught the sense of panic, and fled in turn, leaving their houses to their fate.

In the last paragraph, there is a good description of the King sending off reconnaissance parties towards Honfleur, and the other nearby castles.

Note also how “except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of war” and the “Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiet.”

History is written by the victors, and the victors will always attempt to overlook their setbacks and failures, and enhance their victories.

English accounts set out a timeline starting with the landing, followed by the capture of Bonneville, and then moving on directly to the capture of Auvillars, and then the siege of Caen.

It is when you turn to the French accounts of events, that a curious fact emerges.

There was a three-week siege of Honfleur by the English, and one which was unsuccessful, between the landing and the start of the attack on Caen, which does not get mentioned by the English historians.

The Chronicle of Saint Denys, contains the following description of the landing, and describes the landing operation, and the events of the first week in August as follows.  Like many Medieval Chroniclers, they wildly over estimate the size of the opposing army, however they understand the crucial importance of the control of the river ports on the Seine.

Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI,

“The King of England, delighted at the success [of his navy] which opened the entrance to Normandy, and considering himself already assured of the conquest of the country, embarked with all the forces of his kingdom, and fifty thousand archers, and arrived without obstruction, in the month of August, in view of Harfleur, the most important of the gates of all the duchy, which sends ships to all parts of the world.  The approach of the most violent storm would not have produced a greater terror than that which the arrival of the enemy spread over all the coasts of Normandy.

Everyone thought only of taking refuge in the strongest fortified places, as if to avoid the effects of the attack. The inhabitants of Toucques withdrew and abandoned their town to the King of England.

The prince thought then that it would be useful for him to have carefully guard the mouth of the Seine, by which every day passed all of the goods which were transported to Rouen and from Rouen to Paris, and that this would facilitate his army to have the means of roaming freely and ravaging the countries on either side of the river; consequently, he gave orders to attack Honfleur, a considerable port situated on the left bank. [10]”

Those who governed the state in concert with the Comte d'Armagnac, constable of France, had foreseen this attack. They had also been careful to supply food and all kinds of defensive weapons to this town, which was besides surrounded by solid walls and a wide and deep ditch; In addition, there was a good garrison under the direction of an illustrious Norman knight named Betas de Harneville.

These brave men, summoned to surrender, not only refused to do so, as they had so often made between them, but they resolved by common accord to resist valiantly until death.

After vainly trying to shake their resolution by insinuate and exhortations and by the promises of perpetual franchises, the King of England ordered his men of war and his archers to begin the siege of the city.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. While they ran freely through the country without encountering resistance, the King of England sent messengers of peace to Bayeux, to Evreux, and to the other most important cities, to induce them to surrender, promising to confirm the old franchises of the inhabitants, so that they might, like their ancestors, taste the sweetness of repose and ease. These attempts were unsuccessful.

Wishing, however, to announce his expedition by some feat, he resolved to seize the town of Caen, the most important in Normandy after Rouen, renowned for its numerous population and the wealth of its commerce, and vowed not to let go that he would not have mastered it.

The French believed Honfleur to be a very strong town, knowing that it was furnished with arms and provisions of all kinds, surrounded by thick walls and large towers, and defended by a castle of great extent and almost impregnable. [11]

As far as I am aware, there are no earlier maps of Honfleur available than this map produced in 1656 by Jacques Gomboust. It shows the town as it was before the major redevelopment that took place between 1665 and 1685 when the two large basins were dug that such an attraction to tourists today. One of which largely removed a complete district of the Medieval town. (Dufau 2014)[12]

Figure 3: Honfleur in 1656. Courtesy of Gallica.

Although the walls shown in the 1656 plan have been greatly strengthened after 1417, following the serious sieges of the town that took place during the Wars of Religion in the 1560's and 1590's by the addition of two major Italianate bastions to the south of the town, it is still possible to make out some of the Medieval walls and towers in the plan that must have faced the English in 1417, buried inside the later walls.

The town in 1417 with its walls and towers was remarkably compact (approximately 280 x 195m), and in many ways it is closer in size to a castle, rather than a walled town. 

It was garrisoned by a highly experienced contingent under Betas de Harneville made up of many men who had experience of warfare at sea where even routine voyages could all too quickly turn violent. Until the landing their role had been to blockade Harfleur on a daily basis.

As described in Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys, the Constable of France had already had the opportunity to stock up the town with supplies.

Modern authors describe the landing at Torques and comment on the speed with which it was effected.

They believe that it took only a single day to land the forces, unlike the three or more days that it took to land in 1415 for the Harfleur operation.

I believe that this understanding is incorrect and needs reconsidering.

The 1415 landing had been made onto a rocky beach situated at the base of steep cliffs. The army had landed its siege equipment, onto this beach, and then had to struggled for several to get it up the escarpment and over the hills that overlook Harfleur.

The beach at Torques, although shallow is situated on a lee shore, and any shipping in the bay in the event of rough weather would have been at risk of becoming stranded.

I believe that the reason that the landing in 1417 only took one day, was not because it was a much more efficient landing than in 1415, but was because the King only landed his men and horses. Most of the supplies and a large proportion of the siege equipment remained on the shipping.

The reason for this was that King's aim was first to secure the hinterland inland of Honfleur with the aim of cutting the town off from support so that he could capture it from land.

To do this he planned to pass the shipping laden with the cannon and other siege equipment into the mouth of the Seine where they could be used to achieve his two objectives.

The first objective was to neutralise or capture Honfleur, and the second was to simultaneously to pass supplies into the beleaguered Harfleur.

Following the Trouville landing Titus Livius tells us..

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur]

I believe that it is possible to work out the likely direction of these reconnaissance operations.

Figure 4. Conjectural naval operations in support of the siege of Honfleur in August 1417. Please click on image for larger version. [13]

As can be seen from Figure 4, Bonneville castle and Honfleur were located at either end of a large block of woodland.  These woods are situated on top of a ridge composed of blocky chalk, which is overlain with glacial clays.  This has resulted in a very unstable headland along the seashore, that frequently slumps to this day.  There is evidence however that a track ran along the tops of the bluffs and headland towards Honfleur.  I believe that this was the track used by the English scouts.

The woods were away to the east.  Once the scouts had arrived at the outskirts of Honfleur, they would have been able to summon the town, and to commence the blockading in preparation for the siege.  By the morning of the 3rd of August, the castle of Bonneville sur Toucques had started to negotiate for its surrender. The garrison had agreed that if the castle was not relieved by the 9th of August that it would surrender.

With his bridgehead secured, King Henry V was able to move his guns and other siege engines towards Honfleur, by coasting his fleet along the shore following a route parallel to that previously taken by his scouts.  In the event that any of the French naval vessels inside Honfleur, or from the base at Rouen arrived, the English would be behind the sandbanks in the mouth of the River Seine.

Scouts placed on top of the river bluffs would also be able to warn of any approaching force.

Figure 5. Modern Google Earth Image showing 1, the extent of medieval Honfleur, 2, the approximate High Tide line, 3, the approx Low Tide line, 4, the beach used to land the siege equipment

It is not clear if the King originally planned just a blockade, or if it was intended to capture Honfleur.

From the following text in Sant Denys, it looks as if they intended at first to capture the town.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. 

However, after several days of vigorous assaults and bloody repulses, the King may have begun to realise that he was running the risk of a re-run of the protracted 1415 siege of Harfleur.

With the garrison fighting for its very existence during the siege, and cannon very probably located on the sea shore within range of the mouth of the anchorage of the remaining French warships at Honfleur, the French were unable to interfere with the passing of supplies into Harfleur.  It is not known how many ships entered the river to Harfleur, or indeed how much food they were able to pass to the garrison, but it is clear that the King no longer had cause for concern over the situation at Harfleur for the following winter.

The King had dispatched scouts not just towards Honfleur, but also towards Dives sur Mer, Lisieux and also Auvillars.

These scouts probably had a number of functions to perform. Their principle role was to give the King early warning of the approach of any French relief force that might disrupt his siege operations, but they would also be tasked with driving in any cattle, sheep or pigs and horses that they could secure.

Over the first couple of weeks of August the scouts evidently moved fast, and across a wide swath of Normandy, and their approach caused panic amongst the local population, who seen to have been ill prepared to defend themselves against the English.  I will explore these operations in more detail in my next blog.

We don't know the exact dates of the siege of Honfleur, however it is believed to have lasted three weeks. If, as seems likely, it started by the 3rd of August 1417, it was probably abandoned on or about the 24th of August.

I believe it was the reports that the King was receiving from his scouts that caused him to rapidly reconsider his entire strategy during the period between about the 15th of August and the 21st of August.  The scouts reports were that cities like Lisieux were being abandoned at their approach, and that many smaller castles were surrendering on first summons.  It was becoming clear that the Armagnac parts of France were in no real position to resist his army, if he could move fast enough.

He was gambling that he could secure a large enough city and region before the French could recover from their surprise and unpreparedness, and mobilise forces with which to counterattack him.

In 1415, when the King had left Harfleur for Calais, the French had sunk their differences very quickly, and forces had very quickly been moved to prevent his movement across the river Somme.

He must have appreciated by just how tight a margin he and his battered army had survived the events at Agincourt in 1415.

It was unlikely that he could repeat the march to Calais in 1417, as besides the rivers he had crossed in 1415, he would have also had the Seine to cross. His army in 1417 was smaller than that in 1415, which suggests that he had a smaller operation in mind when he had planned his operations in the Spring of 1417, than the one he had fought in 1415.

With Honfleur unlikely to fall quickly, King Henry faced several dilemmas. Much of his army would wish to return to England by winter, and he had no port secured from which to re-embark his forces.

Needed to capture a port and a town or region large enough to give him security in France, so that he could retreat if necessary.

The ports at the mouth of the River Dives to the east of Caen were the only option open to him, unless he could capture Caen itself.

With reports reaching him from his scouts that told him of his enemies unpreparedness, he began to realise that he had  a fleeting opportunity to capture Caen.

I believe that with Harfleur replenished for another winter, and Honfleur resisting fiercely, this is why he abandoned his siege of the town, which was not to fall into English hands until 1419.

Sadly the accounts of these events in the Chronicle's fail to mention any of ordinary men's  experiences.

However, John Nowell, as an archer may well have spent time in the trenches surrounding Honfleur.

He must have wondered at the cannon that were firing into the town with so much violence and noise.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

Robert, as a household servant of Richard Beauchamp presumably had a more comfortable existence at the siege, perhaps living under a flap at the rear of his masters tent.

[1] http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=39341
http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/battle-seine-henry-vs-unknown-naval-triumph/

[2] Jonathan Sumption. Cursed Kings, The Hundred Wars War IV, page 498-499.
[3] Ian Friel (2017) Henry V's Navy, 39-40. 126-138.

[4]Craig Lambert (2017) Henry V and the crossing to France: reconstructing naval operations for the Agincourt campaign, 1415, Journal of Medieval History, 43:1, 24-39’ DOI: 10.1080/03044181.2016.1236503

[5]Lambert (2017) page 25.

[6] Lambert (2017) page 37.
[7] Lambert (2017) pages 37-38.

[8] Sows, a covered hut on wheels used as a siege engine, which could be used to protect miners as they attempted to reach the base of the castle walls, or a gate. Often covered in leather to protect against fire arrows, or burning items being thrown down onto the sow as it advanced.

[9] Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, editor, The First English Life of King Henry the Fifth written in 1513 by an anonymous Author known commonly as The Translator of Livius

[10] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, volume 2. Page 101 and 102.

[11] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys volume 2. Page 102 and 103.

[12] Dufau, B. 2014, Evolution du Port de Honfleur, see  http://le-vieux-honfleur.fr/photos/files/Contributions/Evolution_du_Port_de_Honfleur.pdf
[13] Based on a Cassini map dating from circa 1750, from the Dave Romsey collection.  L'Havre has been removed.  The off-shore sandbanks may have been in different locations, and the channel of the Seine has moved a great deal since 1417, when it is known to have flowed much closer to the walls of Honfleur than it does today.