The Invasion of Normandy 1417, the siege of Honfleur

Figure 1: King Philip le Bel's shipyard at Rouen, with a fleet sailing on the Seine in the background. [1]

While searching for accounts in the original chronicles that describe the events of 1417 following the landing at Trouville, I have become aware of an intriguing inconsistency between the English and French accounts of the events that followed the landings.

Having recently visited many of the locations described, it became apparent to me that the English accounts have all overlooked, or played down a three week siege of Honfleur that took place in August 1417.

I believe that this reticence to discuss the siege was a conscious attempt to cover-up, what must have been a serious upset for King Henry and his officers at the time.

The successful defence of the port of Honfleur by the town's Armagnac defenders, may indeed have changed the course of the entire expedition, by forcing King Henry V to reconsider and to change the original objectives of his operations.

This collective overlooking of the events by the English chroniclers, has also I believe concealed a second phase of the naval operations in the Bay of the Seine in August 1417.

Figure 2: Honfleur Customs House, one of the few buildings thought to survive from before 1417.

Almost all the chronicles that refer to the landings in France in 1417, like Monstrelet or Gesta Quinti make only a passing reference to the later naval aspects of the operation following the actual landing in 1417.

In order to understand the strategic dilemmas that were presented to King Henry in 1417 by his possession of Harfleur, I believe that it is crucial to first understand the naval situation, before one can fully comprehend the later progress of the campaign in late August and September 1417.

By the spring of 1416 it had become clear that the capture of Harfleur in 1415 was the only tangible and lasting success that King Henry V could claim for the immense effort that the English had put into his attack on France besides the possession of a number of high profile French captives.

This effort had imposed a heavy burden on his kingdom, both in monetary terms through taxation and the raising of loans, and also from the losses of soldiers experienced at the siege of Harfleur.

Maintaining possession of Harfleur was becoming an increasing serious problem for the King and his advisers, because if the garrison capitulated, even this victory would be lost.

The port was closely blockaded by French forces operating from Montvilliers monastery, and several other nearby fortified villages.  The main French siege headquarters at Montvilliers was located less than four kilometres from the walls at Harfleur.

Due to the critical shortages of supplies inside Harfleur and the tightness of the blockade, the garrison were having to mount raids for supplies into the Pay de Caux, often riding out behind the French positions for  twenty or more kilometres away from their base.

However, by doing so they were running huge risks of being cut off upon their return into the town.

The hinterland controlled by the garrison of Harfleur was far too small to allow the town to be self-sufficient, and in any case, many of the former Norman inhabitants of the town had become refugees, or had died during the siege, leaving insufficient cultivators left to work the land.

If the King lost Harfleur, and there was every prospect of this occurring, it would mean that he would lose face and status by comparison to the French leaders, and this in turn might cause him to vital lose support back in England.

Although France was split by a vicious civil war, the outcome of the struggle between at Armagnacs and the Burgundians was uncertain, and at any moment one or other of the principle protagonists might succeed in overcoming his opponent, and then in combining France’s resources against the far less powerful English kingdom.

The shortage of supplies at Harfleur had become critical during 1416.  Sir John Skidmore and Reginald Courtoys, victuallers, along with others, were dispatched by the governor from Harfleur to the king on 6th April 1416 to bring him word of the towns increasingly desperate situation.[2]

To relieve the situation a major naval expedition had had to be mounted from Southampton under the command of the Duke of Bedford, the King’s brother with which to break the French naval blockade of the port of Harfleur. [3]

The French had had all the advantages in this contest because they had a very good naval base at Honfleur from which to operate from, located almost within sight of the beleaguered garrison at Harfleur just across the estuary, as well as from Rouen about 130km up upstream from where to support any attack on English shipping approaching Harfleur.

The outcome of the battle fought by the Duke of Bedford on the 15^th of August 1416, while nominally an English victory, which had enabled Harfleur to be replenished, had come at a high cost to the English in terms of ships sunk, and men lost.  Out of an English fleet originally believed to have numbered about 300 ships, about 20 ships and 700 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers had been either killed or seriously wounded.[4]

If one re-supply operation had required such a major effort, and had cost so many vessels and men, what would be the recurring cost of the future re-supply operations required to supply the garrison be?

How could he re-supply Harfleur several times every year in the face of what might become a steadily reinforced French naval presence at the mouth of the Seine?

How was the King to prevent his sole symbolic acquisition from falling to the French?

How could he do it without placing such a burden on the English economy and people that they might decide to change the regime?

As Craig Lambert [5] and Ian Friel show in their recent research, the organisation of King Henry V’s fleets both for the Harfleur and Agincourt Campaign in 1415, and also for the 1417 invasion were colossal feats of organisation, and ones that demonstrates that the King had developed an experienced and sophisticated staff, led by Richard Cliderowe and John Everdon, able to mobilise these fleets in the relatively short periods available.

The fleet in 1417 included 256 ships, of which 124 belonged to English owners or to the King.  The others were hired in mainly from the Low Countries.  This fleet was considerably smaller in numerical terms than the one used in 1415 when the King appears to have mobilised between 700 and 750 ships, and was smaller than some of the earlier fleets used by Edward III, whose fleets had numbered from between 300 ships and 450 ships for his Brittany expedition.

The 1417 invasion fleet had approximately 117 Nautical miles (135 miles) across which to sail, and were able to make the crossing in favourable weather in two days.

Lambert shows that the crews required to serve the ships would have exceeded the numbers of soldiers that the ships were transporting, requiring a ratio of approximately 1.2 sailors to each soldier carried.[6]

The average number of soldiers carried will have varied widely depending on the size of the vessel, but by dividing the number of men to be carried by the number of vessels we get an average of 18 to 20 soldiers per ship.

I am unable to find any indication of the numbers of horses that the expedition carried, however evidence collated by Lambert (2017) [7] shows that the numbers of horses carried on other expeditions substantially exceeded the numbers of men.  In 1415 the duke of York had taken 770 horses for a retinue of only 450 men.

Dukes were allowed 50 horses, earls, 24, barons 16, knights 6, esquires 4 and archers 1.  So that despite the fact that most of the soldiers would fight on foot, many had ponies to give them strategic mobility, and to carry supplies, equipment and things like tents for the most senior individuals.

The numbers of horses carried per ship depended on the size of ship, but seems to have ranged from 28 or 30, with 51 on one particularly large ship.  The Chronicles also state that in August 1417 the army had substantial quantities of siege engines like Sows [8], as well as cannon, all of which would need carrying across to France.

Although there were over 200 recognised ports around England in the medieval period, the ships in 1417 came from only 50 of these ports, situated along the south coast and as far north as the Humber. 

These ports included small fishing villages like Cromer, Sheringham, Wells-next-the Sea and Thornham.

The average size of English vessel used was only about 78 tonnes, while the average size for the hired in foreign vessels was surprisingly even lower at only 57 tons.

It appears that although there were larger English merchant vessels ranging between 200 and 300 tonnes in burden available that undertook important wine trade to Bordeaux, it appears that these ships were not taken up for service.  Lambert argues that this may have been to avoid disrupting the trade which brought in desperately needed monies from import duties for the Exchequer, and also to avoid potential for political issues with the powerful City merchant interests.

The mouth of the Seine has a complex set of shallow sand bars at its mouth, and as it was the King’s intention to land on open beaches, or to penetrate into the mouth of the river Seine, it would have made good sense to use smaller shallow draft ships, crewed by men accustomed to landing onto exposed open beaches, like those from North Norfolk, rather than it would be to risk larger cargo ships.

The account of the landing at Trouville in my earlier blog post is based on Monstrelet’s Chronicle, which is written from a Burgundian point of view, and by an author located at a considerable distance from the events it was describing.

There are several other chronicles which describe these events from both the English and French points of view.  It is really interesting to compare and contrast their accounts which are written with a view to promoting their patron’s status and to appeal to their partisan potential readers point of view.

The following account comes from an early English translation of Titus Livius chronicle Vita Henrici Quiniti, made into English from the original Latin in 1513, which gives us a description of these events from an English point of view. [9]

Because his journey shoulde not be knowne to his enemies nor where he intended to arive, the Kinge kept his purpose secret from his companie, except that to such persons as was his pleasure he disclosed his councell. And for that cause he had commaunded that all the rest of his nauy should followe those two shipps Royall, whithersoeuer they woulde sayle.

To all the nauy it pleased God to send a good and plesaunt lo winde, vntill the first day of August they all arryued in Normandy, not farr from the Castell of Tonque. Then the watches and guardes of the sea banks, and of the havens of that cuntry, at the first perceauinge so greate an navye, whose streinght they knewe themselues not able to resist, left there stations and fledd to saue theire lyues.

The Kinge w^th all his companie arriued and tooke land, where at his first landinge he dubbed 48 knights of his hoast, such as were able and worthie of that order; and that done he ordered to be pro- claymed all those ordynaunces and edicts that were published tofore the besieginge of Harefleet, and also diuers other such as he thought to be good and proffitable for his hoast. Not farr from the sea banke where he landed were smale and ruynate howses, wherein the Kinge wth diuers other his most familliar and his householde seruants were lodged for that night. And the residue of his hoast were lodged in there tents & pavillions. And when all the shipps were vnladen and discharged of theire carriage he sent againe all the navy into England, except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of warr.

And except also such shipps as the Kinge had assigned to the Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiett.

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur] and of other Castells, Townes and Citties nighe vnto those parts; w^th gentlemen, w^th manie prisoners and greate prayes of beastes, returned to the hoast in euerie thinge satisfied the Kings mynde, for as much as was there charge. There enemies assured of there comminge in so greate a number were all stricken w"" feare, everie man of them for himselfe conveyed there stufe, there beasts, theire graynes, and all other goods into Citties, Castells, and Townes, lo not knowinge whome the Kinge woulde first assiege. Then they prepared there holds, they strenghtened there Townes and walls w^th stones and gunns and other things necessarie.

The account fits well with that written by Monstrelet, but adds several intriguing details.  It describes the French coast watching organisation, and how the watchers fled, quite understandably given the scale of the fleet that was arriving on the tide.  The villagers at Trouville, evidently caught the sense of panic, and fled in turn, leaving their houses to their fate.

In the last paragraph, there is a good description of the King sending off reconnaissance parties towards Honfleur, and the other nearby castles.

Note also how “except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of war” and the “Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiet.”

History is written by the victors, and the victors will always attempt to overlook their setbacks and failures, and enhance their victories.

English accounts set out a timeline starting with the landing, followed by the capture of Bonneville, and then moving on directly to the capture of Auvillars, and then the siege of Caen.

It is when you turn to the French accounts of events, that a curious fact emerges.

There was a three-week siege of Honfleur by the English, and one which was unsuccessful, between the landing and the start of the attack on Caen, which does not get mentioned by the English historians.

The Chronicle of Saint Denys, contains the following description of the landing, and describes the landing operation, and the events of the first week in August as follows.  Like many Medieval Chroniclers, they wildly over estimate the size of the opposing army, however they understand the crucial importance of the control of the river ports on the Seine.

Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI,

“The King of England, delighted at the success [of his navy] which opened the entrance to Normandy, and considering himself already assured of the conquest of the country, embarked with all the forces of his kingdom, and fifty thousand archers, and arrived without obstruction, in the month of August, in view of Harfleur, the most important of the gates of all the duchy, which sends ships to all parts of the world.  The approach of the most violent storm would not have produced a greater terror than that which the arrival of the enemy spread over all the coasts of Normandy.

Everyone thought only of taking refuge in the strongest fortified places, as if to avoid the effects of the attack. The inhabitants of Toucques withdrew and abandoned their town to the King of England.

The prince thought then that it would be useful for him to have carefully guard the mouth of the Seine, by which every day passed all of the goods which were transported to Rouen and from Rouen to Paris, and that this would facilitate his army to have the means of roaming freely and ravaging the countries on either side of the river; consequently, he gave orders to attack Honfleur, a considerable port situated on the left bank. [10]”

Those who governed the state in concert with the Comte d'Armagnac, constable of France, had foreseen this attack. They had also been careful to supply food and all kinds of defensive weapons to this town, which was besides surrounded by solid walls and a wide and deep ditch; In addition, there was a good garrison under the direction of an illustrious Norman knight named Betas de Harneville.

These brave men, summoned to surrender, not only refused to do so, as they had so often made between them, but they resolved by common accord to resist valiantly until death.

After vainly trying to shake their resolution by insinuate and exhortations and by the promises of perpetual franchises, the King of England ordered his men of war and his archers to begin the siege of the city.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. While they ran freely through the country without encountering resistance, the King of England sent messengers of peace to Bayeux, to Evreux, and to the other most important cities, to induce them to surrender, promising to confirm the old franchises of the inhabitants, so that they might, like their ancestors, taste the sweetness of repose and ease. These attempts were unsuccessful.

Wishing, however, to announce his expedition by some feat, he resolved to seize the town of Caen, the most important in Normandy after Rouen, renowned for its numerous population and the wealth of its commerce, and vowed not to let go that he would not have mastered it.

The French believed Honfleur to be a very strong town, knowing that it was furnished with arms and provisions of all kinds, surrounded by thick walls and large towers, and defended by a castle of great extent and almost impregnable. [11]

As far as I am aware, there are no earlier maps of Honfleur available than this map produced in 1656 by Jacques Gomboust. It shows the town as it was before the major redevelopment that took place between 1665 and 1685 when the two large basins were dug that such an attraction to tourists today. One of which largely removed a complete district of the Medieval town. (Dufau 2014)[12]

Figure 3: Honfleur in 1656. Courtesy of Gallica.

Although the walls shown in the 1656 plan have been greatly strengthened after 1417, following the serious sieges of the town that took place during the Wars of Religion in the 1560's and 1590's by the addition of two major Italianate bastions to the south of the town, it is still possible to make out some of the Medieval walls and towers in the plan that must have faced the English in 1417, buried inside the later walls.

The town in 1417 with its walls and towers was remarkably compact (approximately 280 x 195m), and in many ways it is closer in size to a castle, rather than a walled town. 

It was garrisoned by a highly experienced contingent under Betas de Harneville made up of many men who had experience of warfare at sea where even routine voyages could all too quickly turn violent. Until the landing their role had been to blockade Harfleur on a daily basis.

As described in Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys, the Constable of France had already had the opportunity to stock up the town with supplies.

Modern authors describe the landing at Torques and comment on the speed with which it was effected.

They believe that it took only a single day to land the forces, unlike the three or more days that it took to land in 1415 for the Harfleur operation.

I believe that this understanding is incorrect and needs reconsidering.

The 1415 landing had been made onto a rocky beach situated at the base of steep cliffs. The army had landed its siege equipment, onto this beach, and then had to struggled for several to get it up the escarpment and over the hills that overlook Harfleur.

The beach at Torques, although shallow is situated on a lee shore, and any shipping in the bay in the event of rough weather would have been at risk of becoming stranded.

I believe that the reason that the landing in 1417 only took one day, was not because it was a much more efficient landing than in 1415, but was because the King only landed his men and horses. Most of the supplies and a large proportion of the siege equipment remained on the shipping.

The reason for this was that King's aim was first to secure the hinterland inland of Honfleur with the aim of cutting the town off from support so that he could capture it from land.

To do this he planned to pass the shipping laden with the cannon and other siege equipment into the mouth of the Seine where they could be used to achieve his two objectives.

The first objective was to neutralise or capture Honfleur, and the second was to simultaneously to pass supplies into the beleaguered Harfleur.

Following the Trouville landing Titus Livius tells us..

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur]

I believe that it is possible to work out the likely direction of these reconnaissance operations.

Figure 4. Conjectural naval operations in support of the siege of Honfleur in August 1417. Please click on image for larger version. [13]

As can be seen from Figure 4, Bonneville castle and Honfleur were located at either end of a large block of woodland.  These woods are situated on top of a ridge composed of blocky chalk, which is overlain with glacial clays.  This has resulted in a very unstable headland along the seashore, that frequently slumps to this day.  There is evidence however that a track ran along the tops of the bluffs and headland towards Honfleur.  I believe that this was the track used by the English scouts.

The woods were away to the east.  Once the scouts had arrived at the outskirts of Honfleur, they would have been able to summon the town, and to commence the blockading in preparation for the siege.  By the morning of the 3rd of August, the castle of Bonneville sur Toucques had started to negotiate for its surrender. The garrison had agreed that if the castle was not relieved by the 9th of August that it would surrender.

With his bridgehead secured, King Henry V was able to move his guns and other siege engines towards Honfleur, by coasting his fleet along the shore following a route parallel to that previously taken by his scouts.  In the event that any of the French naval vessels inside Honfleur, or from the base at Rouen arrived, the English would be behind the sandbanks in the mouth of the River Seine.

Scouts placed on top of the river bluffs would also be able to warn of any approaching force.

Figure 5. Modern Google Earth Image showing 1, the extent of medieval Honfleur, 2, the approximate High Tide line, 3, the approx Low Tide line, 4, the beach used to land the siege equipment

It is not clear if the King originally planned just a blockade, or if it was intended to capture Honfleur.

From the following text in Sant Denys, it looks as if they intended at first to capture the town.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. 

However, after several days of vigorous assaults and bloody repulses, the King may have begun to realise that he was running the risk of a re-run of the protracted 1415 siege of Harfleur.

With the garrison fighting for its very existence during the siege, and cannon very probably located on the sea shore within range of the mouth of the anchorage of the remaining French warships at Honfleur, the French were unable to interfere with the passing of supplies into Harfleur.  It is not known how many ships entered the river to Harfleur, or indeed how much food they were able to pass to the garrison, but it is clear that the King no longer had cause for concern over the situation at Harfleur for the following winter.

The King had dispatched scouts not just towards Honfleur, but also towards Dives sur Mer, Lisieux and also Auvillars.

These scouts probably had a number of functions to perform. Their principle role was to give the King early warning of the approach of any French relief force that might disrupt his siege operations, but they would also be tasked with driving in any cattle, sheep or pigs and horses that they could secure.

Over the first couple of weeks of August the scouts evidently moved fast, and across a wide swath of Normandy, and their approach caused panic amongst the local population, who seen to have been ill prepared to defend themselves against the English.  I will explore these operations in more detail in my next blog.

We don't know the exact dates of the siege of Honfleur, however it is believed to have lasted three weeks. If, as seems likely, it started by the 3rd of August 1417, it was probably abandoned on or about the 24th of August.

I believe it was the reports that the King was receiving from his scouts that caused him to rapidly reconsider his entire strategy during the period between about the 15th of August and the 21st of August.  The scouts reports were that cities like Lisieux were being abandoned at their approach, and that many smaller castles were surrendering on first summons.  It was becoming clear that the Armagnac parts of France were in no real position to resist his army, if he could move fast enough.

He was gambling that he could secure a large enough city and region before the French could recover from their surprise and unpreparedness, and mobilise forces with which to counterattack him.

In 1415, when the King had left Harfleur for Calais, the French had sunk their differences very quickly, and forces had very quickly been moved to prevent his movement across the river Somme.

He must have appreciated by just how tight a margin he and his battered army had survived the events at Agincourt in 1415.

It was unlikely that he could repeat the march to Calais in 1417, as besides the rivers he had crossed in 1415, he would have also had the Seine to cross. His army in 1417 was smaller than that in 1415, which suggests that he had a smaller operation in mind when he had planned his operations in the Spring of 1417, than the one he had fought in 1415.

With Honfleur unlikely to fall quickly, King Henry faced several dilemmas. Much of his army would wish to return to England by winter, and he had no port secured from which to re-embark his forces.

Needed to capture a port and a town or region large enough to give him security in France, so that he could retreat if necessary.

The ports at the mouth of the River Dives to the east of Caen were the only option open to him, unless he could capture Caen itself.

With reports reaching him from his scouts that told him of his enemies unpreparedness, he began to realise that he had  a fleeting opportunity to capture Caen.

I believe that with Harfleur replenished for another winter, and Honfleur resisting fiercely, this is why he abandoned his siege of the town, which was not to fall into English hands until 1419.

Sadly the accounts of these events in the Chronicle's fail to mention any of ordinary men's  experiences.

However, John Nowell, as an archer may well have spent time in the trenches surrounding Honfleur.

He must have wondered at the cannon that were firing into the town with so much violence and noise.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

Robert, as a household servant of Richard Beauchamp presumably had a more comfortable existence at the siege, perhaps living under a flap at the rear of his masters tent.

[1] http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=39341
http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/battle-seine-henry-vs-unknown-naval-triumph/

[2] Jonathan Sumption. Cursed Kings, The Hundred Wars War IV, page 498-499.
[3] Ian Friel (2017) Henry V's Navy, 39-40. 126-138.

[4]Craig Lambert (2017) Henry V and the crossing to France: reconstructing naval operations for the Agincourt campaign, 1415, Journal of Medieval History, 43:1, 24-39’ DOI: 10.1080/03044181.2016.1236503

[5]Lambert (2017) page 25.

[6] Lambert (2017) page 37.
[7] Lambert (2017) pages 37-38.

[8] Sows, a covered hut on wheels used as a siege engine, which could be used to protect miners as they attempted to reach the base of the castle walls, or a gate. Often covered in leather to protect against fire arrows, or burning items being thrown down onto the sow as it advanced.

[9] Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, editor, The First English Life of King Henry the Fifth written in 1513 by an anonymous Author known commonly as The Translator of Livius

[10] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, volume 2. Page 101 and 102.

[11] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys volume 2. Page 102 and 103.

[12] Dufau, B. 2014, Evolution du Port de Honfleur, see  http://le-vieux-honfleur.fr/photos/files/Contributions/Evolution_du_Port_de_Honfleur.pdf
[13] Based on a Cassini map dating from circa 1750, from the Dave Romsey collection.  L'Havre has been removed.  The off-shore sandbanks may have been in different locations, and the channel of the Seine has moved a great deal since 1417, when it is known to have flowed much closer to the walls of Honfleur than it does today.

Chevauchée, or great great.....uncle, what were you up to in the summer of 1432?

Figure 1. A monument at the base of the castle walls at St Céneri recording the many sieges. [1]

 As a small boy my parents would drag my brother and I off to nearby castles in order to run off our excess energy wherever and whenever we were on holiday.

Brought up learning to read Ladybird books about Warwick the King Maker, and King Henry V, I have been fixated on castles ever since.

For most of my life I have wondered what it would have been like to have lived in castles, or indeed to have taken part in the events surrounding these castles.

However gaining an ability to learn these details had always seemed beyond my grasp.  It always seemed to me to be something that I could only ever imagine in a general sense, but that it would never actually be possible for me to say in which castle, or when my ancestors had been present if at all.

I had to assume that they would forever remain lost in the mists of time, peasants who had left no trace in history.

Of course history is largely written by the winners, and in general only features the "important people" and my forebears would have almost certainly only ever have been bit players in events all those centuries ago.

However with the incredible increase in access now possible through the internet to archives, and especially thanks to the work of Doctor Anne Curry and her colleagues, it has sudden become possible for me to locate some of my forebears in more than 55 Medieval documents encompassing literally hundreds of events that took place from 1371 until 1444, covering about 10 individuals, most of whom are either direct forebears of mine, or who are ancestral brothers, uncles, cousins or probably closely related to my Nowell's from Wakefield, the villages of Read, Nether Harwood and nearby in the Ribble Valley.

Figure 2. The Medieval Chapel of St Céneri [2]

A few years ago Dr Anne Curry a Professor of Medieval history at the Southampton University, former editor of the  Journal of Medieval History, and a specialist in the Hundred's Years' War  published her seminal book on the Battle of Agincourt, which contained an incredible list of the names of those who took part in the battle on the English side.

I had looked through the list with awe not imagining that such lists could have survived at this time.

Brought up at school on films like the 1940's film of Shakespeare's Henry V, I was well aware that...

"men back in English now safe in their beds will curse themselves for not having been here, and think less of their own manhood when they listen to the stories of those who fought with us here on St. Crispin’s Day."

Having long considered that I would be amongst those accursed, I was completely unaware that Gilbert Nowell, an esquire had been on that field on the eve of St Crispin's Day.

Also unknown to me, was that in 2009, Anne Curry and her colleagues at Southampton had embarked on a much larger project called "The Soldier in later Medieval England"[3], to transcribe and analyse records from 1369 up to 1453.

Stumbling on this amazing resource in recent days, I am now happily campaigning my way around the archives and back lanes of France, if only electronically, in the footsteps of these men, surprised to find that I can place them at many of the key events of those years.



Figure 3. Output from the Medieval Soldier database showing the record of John Nowell's service at the Siege of St Severin.[4]

I have started collecting information about many of these campaigns, however it is already clear that many of these sieges and battles will take months of work to study and collate.

Starting therefore with a relatively small action, chosen more or less at random, the first challenge was to locate St Severin, which when you turn to Google and Google maps takes you to many locations of churches named after this well known saint, almost all of which evidently don't fit.

However, all was not lost because Enguerrand de Monstrelet, a contemporary chronicler writes in his Chronicle [5]

In this same year of 1434 ,[6] the lord Willoughby [7], accompanied by Mathagon, [8] and some other captains, and from eight hundred to a thousand combatants, laid siege to a very strong place in the country of Maine called St. Severin, about two leagues distant from Alençon, which was held by the French.  The governor was a gallant knight, named sir Antony de Loreuil, who, on arrival of the enemy, made a vigorous defence: nevertheless, the English surrounded the place on all sides, and remained there about six weeks.

While this was going forward, the lord de Bueil, sir William Blesset, the lord de la Varenne, and other French captains, assembled about fourteen hundred fighting men, with the intent to force the enemy to raise their siege. They remained for some days at Beaumont le Vicomte, [9] where part of them were quartered, and the remainder at Vivien, [10] four leagues distant from St. Severin.  While at Beaumont they called a council of all the chief captains, to consider how they should act; when, after much noise and debating, they determined to attempt withdrawing the besieged the back way out of the town. The captains now returned to their different quarters, and established good guards around them during the night, both of horse and foot. The lord de Beuil was, on this expedition, lieutenant for the lord Charles d’Anjou, and had the charge of his banner.

This same night a detachment of the English, having had intelligence of the advance of the French, took the field, and marched in silence until they came near to the town of Vivien, whither they sent scouts to reconnoitre the state of the French, who, having twice entered Vivien, brought word they were in tolerable good order. The English then made an attack on their quarters about day-break, and easily defeated them without much loss. Many were taken and killed: among the last was a valiant man from Amiens, but originally from Auvergne, called John de Bellay. When the business was over, the English took the field with their prisoners; but the lords de Bueil and de la Varenne, who were in Beaumont, hearing of this discomfiture from the runaways, made instant preparations to pursue the English, who no sooner saw them than they rejoiced, thinking to defeat them as they had done the others. – and each party met gallantly. Many valorous acts were done on both sides; but, in the end, the English lost the day, partly from the prisoners whom they had taken at Vivien joining the French. A valiant knight named Arthur [11] was slain, and Mathagon made prisoner, -- but the bastard of Salisbury [12] fled. Four hundred, or more, of the English were killed or taken, and the French left masters of the field, very joyful for their victory. When the English who had remained at the siege of St. Severin heard of the ill success of their companions, they raised the siege, and retreated to the garrisons whence they had come.

Monstrelet places "St. Severin, about two leagues distant from Alençon" and as a league was about 3 miles or 9.6 kilometres this accords well with 11.8 kilometres given on Google Earth to Saint Céneri.

Starting by research with John Nowell's commanding officer Robert Willoughby who was aged 47 at the time of the siege and subsequent encounter battle, I found that he had been the son of William Willoughby, 5th Baron Willoughby de Eresby, and his first wife, Lucy le Strange, daughter of Roger le Strange, 5th Baron Strange of Knockin in Shropshire.

This immediately struck me as significant as it was the title of the Stanley family. 

I already knew that my Nowell ancestors had served with the Stanleys in campaigns from 1496 onwards right through and up until the English Civil War, when my Great x 6 Grandfather Roger Nowell had commanded the defence of Lathom House in 1648.  He later became the first governor of Lord Stanley's castles on the Isle of Man following the Restoration in 1660.

Perhaps the relationship with the Stanley's who were one of Lancashire's premier landowners goes back even further than I had previously thought.

Willoughby was a highly experienced officer who had fought at Agincourt and very many other of the significant actions since then. [13]

At this point in the past history would have ended for us, with only the names and deeds of the Lords and senior personalities recorded, and we would have had absolutely no idea who had taken part in these actions, however thanks to the recent transcriptions and the happy accident that the papers have survived in the Bibliothéque Nationale Collection Clairambault we can now see even the names of the archers and foot soldiers, and the men in the trenches.

If you go to the "Soldier in Later Medieval Website" and go to the database tab, and then select the garrison database, input "Severin" and select "location" for you get 1341 entries.

Figure 4. Screen shot for the garrison database for Severin, showing the start of the 1341 entries.

The list is absolutely fascinating as it illustrates the polyglot nature of the men who served in these forces.

A considerable number of whom appear to be from the north west of England like the Nowell's, as they have names I can recognise from my wider research.

There is perhaps unsurprisingly also a very strong contingent from Wales, as well as a large number of men from France. Some of the other names look German and even Scandinavian. I will try to track down men some of these over the coming months.

Figure 5. An example of one of the muster rolls transcribed by the project. Not necessarily of the ones discussed here.

Figure 6. An indenture, showing one of the lists from the period, which were drawn up in two identical columns, and then cut in two with a wavy line so that officials could by matching up the cut ensure that one of them was not a forgery. [14]

What do we know about John Nowell?

While it is not possible to be absolutely sure that it is the same man, a John Nowell, an archer was in William Swinburne's contingent under Humphrey Duke of Gloucester during 1417, as was Robert Nowell, although Robert was in another unit Richard Beauchamp, Lord Abergavenny's band of archers.

Although he may have remained in France, we cannot rule out his having returned to England.  He next appears to have served in France at the Siege of La Ferte-Bernard in 1426, and he may have been the same man who was in William Minors contingent of archers at the Siege of Louviers on the 20th of June 1431.

What became of John Nowell, we will probably never know.  However he appears to have survived the serious defeat at Vivions, and therefore it is very possible that he was one of the men who had remained behind in the siege works.

A John Nowell appears in the contingents of Christopher Fretevault and John Kendal in an list dated 30th November 1437 at Mantes, and also in 1441 under  Sir John Cressy and Richard Duke of York on yet another expedition to France.

This latter campaign with Richard Duke of York (1411 to 1460) may help identify John Nowell's connection to the wider Nowell family.

The Nowell's of Read in Lancashire were cattle breeders and very probably also drovers who owned land along the prime droving route from Pendle and Read where their primary holdings were to a cluster of villages situated around and south of Wakefield on the route to the Great North Road.

Roger Nowell, one of my 12 x great grandfather's "of Arksey" whose will is dated 14th June 1486 clearly shows that he is the same Roger Nowell who also owned Read and who gave on the 20th of January 20th 1483, lands that had belonged to Thurstan Banastre, his uncle in Wakefield, Stanley, Sandall and elsewhere in the County of York to the Wardens of Wakefield Church for the foundation of a Chantry to pray for the soul of Richard Duke of York who had been killed twenty three years earlier during 1460 as his force left Sandal Castle and was ambushed by a much larger force of Lancastrians.

Much of the land the Nowell's used to graze their store cattle and three year old oxen on route to East Anglia or Smithfield was rented in the Wakefield area from Richard Duke of York.

The Nowell's had been engaged in droving for at least a Century by 1432. They had established younger sons at Castle Donnington, Thorpe by Balne, South Mimms and Enfield as well as in the City, all holding land at significant points along the 270 mile cattle route south to Smithfield.

Marching the long distances required of soldiers on campaign can have presented them with few difficulties as they must have been conditioned to the marches by the long droves that they had previously been undertaking.

Roger's father was called Alexander Nowell, and he also appears in the Protection lists of July 1437.  His great grandfather was called John Nowell, and he had taken out a protection on the 14th of May 1415, in order to serve with Henry V in France.

The pedigrees that survive for the Nowell's were drawn up in the 19th Century by Churston and Whittaker concentrate on the older sons, and can be shown to have missed out many younger brothers, or younger sons of younger sons. The same few Christian names were used again and again in every generation. It was generally the "spares", and not the heirs who went to France as archers.

Thurstan Banastre, uncle to Roger Nowell, was son and heir to John Banastre. The same garrison database includes 42 entries for Banastre during this same period, with John, Richard and Robert Banastre's also appearing in Robert Willoughby's garrison at Pont de l'Arche in 1430.

As for Baron de Eresby, Robert Willoughby, he died aged 67 in 1452, knowing that Normandy had been lost to the French. He was buried in a monastic College at Mettingham which he had acquired through his wife Cecilly's family. I expect he had a few lives on his conscience, and would have felt in need of some prayers to ease his path through purgatory.

Figure 7. Entrance to Mettingham Castle and College, buried place of Robert Lord, Willoughby [15]

Figure 8. An extract from Google Maps showing the locations of Saint Céneri, Beaumont and Vivoin

We have already seen how Enguerrand de Monstrelet described how a council of all the chief captains of the French, considering how they should act; when, after much noise and debating, they determined to attempt "withdrawing the besieged the back way out of the town."

By going to Beaumont-sur-Sarthe on Google Earth it is possible to locate the old town square, and its nearby Motte that was probably the forward operating base that lords de Bueil and de la Varenne had used in their approach march as they attempted to break the siege of Saint Céneri.

Figure 9. Beaumont-sur-Sarthe market place. The motte is under the trees in the background.

Do those houses still contain the timber frames of the houses that looked out over the French troops as they hurriedly formed up to rush off and rescue their colleagues. Perhaps the fugitives from Vivoin has come running the three kilometres, shouting their warnings, as they arrived in this market place?

I am uncertain where the English had started out from to besiege Saint Céneri, however I have been able to establish that quite a few of those in the English contingent has previously been in the garrison of Alençon where the database shows the names of the English garrisons who had been present in the town in 1431 and in 1435.

It is about 27 kilometres from the Alençon or northern side of Saint Céneri, where I am presuming the main English siege camp would have been located to Vivoins.

Figure 10. The possible routes from Saint Céneri to Vivoin.

There are several possible routes that could have been taken.  The route I have selected would have taken the English further away from the main French camp at Beaumont and have had the advantage of placing the River Sarthe between the two forces. We have no evidence to confirm that this route was the one used, but it fits the known timing well.

Monstrelet wrote:

"This same night a detachment of the English, having had intelligence of the advance of the French, took the field, and marched in silence until they came near to the town of Vivien, whither they sent scouts to reconnoitre the state of the French, who, having twice entered Vivien, brought word they were in tolerable good order."

 Google suggests that this march would have taken five and a half hours to walk. In practise, given that the approach march was done in the dark, and with the probable presence of a nearby enemy force within the district, this must have been eight to ten hours of very tense marching.

Figure 11.  The Priory of St-Hippolye, Vivoins.

The village of Vivions must have been of considerable importance in 1432.  There still remain with the town, magnificent buildings that once formed the Priory of St-Hippolye.  It doesn't appear that the town had any real defences, compared with Beaumont, for instance with it's castle mount. 

I expect it was the combination of a lack of any obvious defence, and the probable presence of pillage that had encouraged the English to mount the raid. 

As can be seen from the following picture, the Priory was a substantial building, much of which is probably old enough to have been present in 1432, and to have witnessed the raid. One wonders where the tithe barn was?

Armies have always lived on their stomachs.  Their pay was often years in arrears, and starving out your enemy was the primary way to win a siege.  However it was often the besiegers, living in crude huts built out of branches, turf and grass, and not the besieged, tucked up as they were behind the walls of a castle, with a cellar full of food and drink who suffered most.

Figure 12. The former Priory Buildings at Vivoins.

The English must have realised that they only had limited time available in which to remain at Vivoins before the French forces in Beaumont and very probably Fresnay-sur-Sarthe also would act to cut off their retreat. However buoyed up by their mornings success, and quite possibly loaded down with recently plundered food and drink, they set off to return to Saint Céneri.





Figure 13.  The French counterattack.

A lesson no doubt re-learnt by every new generation of soldier is that counter attacks are most successful when mounted as soon as is possible after the enemy has taken the position, and before they have time to consolidate.  

The French commanders, Lords de Bueil and de la Varenne, appear to have been highly experienced and effective officers.  They had their troops underway quite possibly even before the English had started their return march.

As is often the case with Medieval battlefields, it is not clear where this counterattack took place.

However by inspection of Figure 13, from Google Earth there appears to have been a Route d'Or that crossed the Sarthe, which was located closer to Beaumont than it was to Vivoin, and where it would have been possible for a fast moving French unit to get across the most obvious of the English return routes.

The Route d'Or is believed to have been a Roman Road, and the even today the bridge is described as a Roman Bridge.

It is unlikely that today's bridge is the same one that was used in 1432, but it is possible that the Medieval bridge was in part at least Roman in origin.

It is clear that the French attack was not an ambush as the over confident English are recorded to have been able to see them coming. I believe the French almost certainly marched to Juillé.



Figure 14. The Rue de Belevent, D27Bis

I have not been able to locate older maps of the area, however it looks very likely that the road shown in Figure 14 leaving Vivoins was the one the English would have taken. 

Medieval soldiers preferred to use ridge routes when moving at speed, as they could see into the distance, and this would lessen the chance of their being surprised. This Medieval approach differs from that of later 20th Century soldiers who are taught to avoid moving along ridge lines at all costs in order to prevent their being "skylined" and then being shelled. This was a threat the Medieval soldier did not have to fear.

The road rises towards Juillé almost all of the way.  As can be seen in Figure 14, 15 and 16; the views to the side of the road are good towards the River Sarthe, and have probably little changed over the past 583 years.

Beaumont is to the left of both of these images.  The road from Beaumont over the Roman Bridge that crossed the River Sarthe to Juillé runs from left to right beyond the horizon behind the trees.

At this point the English troops who had been marching, and in action since last light on the previous day must have been starting to feel really tired after the night march and adrenaline rush of the assault. We have no idea at what time the encounter battle took place, however it was probably in the middle of the morning, three or four hours after the village had fallen to them.



Figure 15. Mid way to Juillé

The column of weary English laden with plunder, and quite possibly driving stolen livestock, was also trying to herd along a number of despondent French captives, some of whom were probably wounded.

They all faced a minimum of six or seven hours of further of footslogging if they were to reach safety.

The French from Beaumont who were furious over the raid and fresh, were already reaching the river crossing.

Figure 16. Reaching Juillé.

At this point about 500 metres from the cross roads and the nearest houses, the village first comes into sight for the English to the left of Figure 16: today and quite possibly then the view is interrupted by trees.

The vanguard of the French were probably streaming up from the horizon to the left of the photo.

At first these may only have been the mounted scouts and officers, and they probably appeared to be little threat to the English column.

Figure 17. An overview of the probable battlefield

The English (in red) coming up the lane would have crossed the ridge shown in Figure 16 in yellow, and it would have been at this point that they would have first have been aware that they were facing appreciable numbers of French who were probably streaming up the two routes shown in blue.  The dotted red line shows the intended route of the English back to their camp.

The Google Earth image is interesting because it clearly shows that the road network have changed considerably since the Medieval period.

Earlier tracks persist as crop marks. There was probably a scramble on the part of the long straggling English column to get past the French force that was attacking into their flank. The lack of time from the moment that the French first became visible in significant numbers didn't allow time enough for the archers to form up, as the English were situated 500 metres away at most from the French .

The French prisoners must have realised that it was now, or never, if they were to avoid many weary uncomfortable months in a dungeon, and they turned on their captors.

Perhaps initially less concerned about prisoners turning on them than at Agincourt, the English don't seem to have time (or possibly the will) to have killed their prisoners.

 Presumably the next couple of hours must have been pandemonium.

In Medieval battles the casualties tended not to be that high during the actual fighting, often less than 10%. It was during the pursuit that the real damage would have occurred.

The mounted men like the bastard of Salisbury probably got away relatively easily. Many of the men at arms and some of the archers may also have had horses, however many would have been on foot.

It was about 20 kilometres up the old Roman road back to Alençon, which is where I expect most of the fugitives will have made their way.

It was closer than their former camp that they had left about 24 hours before.

Many must have been cut down along the road; it must have been a really tough night for the wounded or those who became lost or separated.

Figure 18.  Alençon Castle.

The fugitives must have been hugely relieved and have felt much more secure once they were safely back inside the gates of the Chateau at Alençon.

The men left behind at Saint Céneri probably only numbered between 200 and 300. They must have spent an anxious day, hoping that the French garrison was not aware of just how few of them there were left in the bulwarks and trenches.



Figure 18. The church at Saint Céneri

The relief on the faces of the defenders at St Severin must have been enormous when they realised that the English were slipping away from the siege lines.

Presumably it was the French forces fresh from their victory who first clattered into the town over this beautiful old bridge.

Figure 19. The former Castle was located in the area of the highest trees. 

Figure 20. Google Earth Image showing the area around Saint Céneri

Figure 19 and 20 show the same area, and from them it is possible to locate the approximate position of the former castle.

History sadly does not seemed to have recorded where the English siege lines were at Saint Céneri, however given the villages location in the bottom of a steep valley and in the bend of the river, the English must presumably have been trying to take the hills that over looked the castle, like the one this photo was taken from.

I believe that the castle was located inside the ellipse in blue. With the castle and village secured by the bend of the River it formed a very strong position.

The description by Monstrelet of how the French relief force had planned to withdraw the garrison by the back way, begins to make sense, if the English were occupying the mouth of the promontory somewhere close to the positions shown in red.

Presumably with local knowledge they expected the garrison to be aware of a place where they could slip through the river at a shallow spot and to get away into the wooded valley sides. With about two kilometres of river bank to patrol around the outside of the huge river bend, it would have been almost impossible for the English to have patrolled it adequately, especially at night with only about 1,300 men to man the defences.

Although Saint Céneri had lived to fight another day, this was certainly not the last time the English would attack the castle. There were other sieges in 1434 and 1439.

I have never been to Saint Céneri, but it is certainly high on the list of places I would like to visit in future, although I do promise not to bring a cannon.

If you are aware of other records that cover these events, in French or English, I would be very pleased to hear from you. [balmer.nicholas@gmail.com] If you can trace your ancestors back to these events, and can tell me anything about any of the other men who stood shoulder to shoulder with John Nowell, I would also love to hear from you.

I would also like to say a big thank you to Anne Curry to all those who worked on The Soldier in Later Medieval England project. You have added immensely to my knowledge of these events, and I will have many happy hours and days researching into all those other locations and events you have recorded.

[1] Picture courtesy of http://a133.idata.over-blog.com/4/34/42/48/Notre-terroir/11-04-23-Chateau-Saint-Ceneri-3.JPG [2] http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint-C%C3%A9neri-le-G%C3%A9rei#/media/File:Chapelle_St-C%C3%A9neri-le_G%C3%A9rei.JPG.[3] http://www.medievalsoldier.org/ [4] http://www.medievalsoldier.org/search_garrison.php [5] The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet: Containing an Account of the by Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Bon-Joseph Dacier, volume 1, page 631. [6] Thought to be in error for 1432 given elsewhere. Interestingly the local authorities who installed the monument give a date of 1434. Can anybody tell me which is correct, or were there more than one siege in this volatile frontier zone?
[7] Robert Willoughby. [8] Believed to be Matthew Gough who is known to have been captured after the siege. See http://yba.llgc.org.uk/en/s-GOUG-MAT-1390.html for this man, who played a very important role in the events leading up to the loss of the first English "Empire" in Normandy. [9] Believed to be Beaumont-sur-Sarthe [10] Spelt Vivoin today. [11] John Arthur, Knight in the database. [12] Footnote says John, bastard son of the great earl of Salisbury, to whom in his will he bequeathed fifty marks. See Dugdale. [13] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Willoughby,_6th_Baron_Willoughby_de_Eresby [14] From http://historyspot.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/attachments/digital_history_medieval_soldier.pdf [15] Entrance to Mettingham Castle - geograph.org.uk - 984718 by Graham Horn. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons -