Covent Garden & Sir John Baber, the Plague and a vanished monument

 

Fig. 1. Covent Garden in 1737 by Balthazar Nebot 

[Please click on image for larger version.]

The following blog is written in the hope that it might attract the attention of somebody with a deeper knowledge of events in Covent Garden during the period between 1650 and 1700 than I currently have, or who may have had access to records or accounts that I have yet to find. My interest in Covent Garden stems from the discovery that one of my great x 8 grandfathers, Sir John Baber was a physician living in Covent Garden at the time of the 1665 Plague and the 1660 Great Fire of London.

At the time he was one of three physician's to King Charles II, and it is clear that he played a leading role in events during the plague of 1665.

That his role had been very important is demonstrated by the gratitude of the local community expressed by the erection of a stone column that once stood in the centre of the Plaza at Covent Garden, and which can clearly been seen in Balthazar Nebot's painting and several other paintings from the period. The column was erected in 1668-9 and stood there in the square until about 1750. It was erected by a Mr. Tomlinson, a churchwarden using funds raised by the parishioners of Covent Garden.

Fig. 2. Extract from Nebot's painting showing the column.

“The churchwardens of St Paul's Church accounts record that "Upon due consideration of those many signall services, that the Honorable Sir John Baber hath don this Parish from Time to Time Wee thought it good to affix his Coate of Armes, in one of the Sheilds belonging to the Colume, as a Perpetuall acknowledgement of our gratitude, and to Refuse any present from him that should be tendered Towards the Charge thereof.”

 

                                Fig 3. Photo of a miniature of Sir John Baber by Gibson.

By 1665 Sir John Baber had been physician to King Charles II for about four years.  He was one of three physicians who took it in turn to attend at court on the King, for which he was promised payment for 112 days per year.

During October 1667, Sir John petitioned "for a warrant for payment from the Exchequer of 954l 4s. arrears of his pension of 12s a day, from 1st December 1662 to 16th April 1667, there being no fund at the Green Cloth from which it can be paid."

He annexed a  "Note of monies due to Sir John Baber; for 1597 days, total., 958l 4s." [2]

It is thought that Sir John had obtained this post through the recommendation of a near neighbour, Dr. Manton, rector of St. Paul's Covent Garden, who with other Presbyterian divines, had taken prominent part in the restoration Charles II. He had however had the honour of Knighthood being also bestowed on him 19 March 1660 at the Restoration, immediately after the King had returned from exile, which suggests that he had played some part in those events.

I have no detailed knowledge of what this role during the period up to the Restoration had been.  Can anybody point me in the direction of any accounts that cover his involvement in these events, or which might have clues in them?

However, a fascinating clue survives in the following extracts from the Journal of the House of Common’s records a debate that took place on: -

"Saturday, March 10th, 1659; Afternoon.

London Militia.

A BILL for settling the Militia for the City of London; and Liberties thereof, was this Day read the First and Second time; and, upon the Question, committed unto Major-General Alderman Browne, Sir Wm. Wheeler, Mr. Attorney Lechmere, Mr. Pryn, Sir Walter Earle, Mr. Weaver: And that they do presently withdraw; and amend this Bill.

Resolved, That Alderman Major-General Browne's Name be placed in this Bill, next after Alderman Vyner.

Resolved, That the same Qualifications be inserted in this Bill, as are in the general Bill for settling the Militia.

Resolved, That this Bill shall continue for One Year, or until the Parliament take other Order.

 A Rider was tendered to this Bill, That Colonel Thomas Lister, John Baber Esquire, Thomas Bayles, Alexander Pym, Charles Pym, Ralph Halsell, Robert Payton, and Captain Thomas Wytham, be added Commissioners for the Militia for the City of Westminster, and Liberties thereof: Which was read; and agreed unto; and ordered to be Part of the Bill."

A role within the London Militia would have provided John Baber a very useful position from which to provide information to Royalist spies. The London Trained Bands who had made up the militia were the core of England's standing army.

It is a great pity that no accounts seems to have survived of Sir John’s role during the Great Plague. That he had played a significant role is however clear from the following document, which describes arrangements that were made so that the Court could return to London, from it’s self imposed exile to Oxford made to avoid becoming caught up in the epidemic.

December 19^th 1665. Westminster.

Edm Godfrey to Fras. Lann.  Memoranda to be imparted to Mountjoy Earl of Newport.

            The workhouse in the New Churchyard is finished, and the vault made the largest burying place in England.  The Lords Chamberlain’s letter, published by the King’s order in all churches near Whitehall, has been of great use to prevent the swarming of rascally lodgers, who, if they have not occasioned, have greatly spread the plague there, and brought more charge on the inhabitants than they are able to support.

            All the common Sewers and watercourses have been cleaned against the return of the King and Court.  Has paid Dr. Innard at the pest house 200l, for services till All Hallow’s Day.

            Since which he pretends to higher terms, on some agreement with Sir John Baber.  He and all his regiment are to be dismissed the pesthouse, except three warders and a nurse or two, to prevent its being pulled down as formerly.

            Has met Mr. Warcupp twice a week in Convent Garden Vestry Meetings; they have agreed well, and the people seem satisfied with there government, except some poor, who cry out through dearness of fuel, and want of employment because King & Court are away, and some of the nobility and gentry forget their debts as well as their charity.  They have ordered all churchyards where many have been buried to be filled up with fresh mould, and earth a yard high laid on the graves etc. etc.[4]

From the above text it would appear that Sir John must have been one of those people in authority, who had remained in London to battle with the disease amongst those who could not flee.

He is listed as one of only 27 doctors and physicians out of about 200 who had been resident in London who had remained in London throughout the plague. 

As both one of the local doctors and also a Justice of the Peace, I expect that he must have been amongst those who attended the meetings of the St. Paul’s Vestry which took twice a week. I expect that Sir John had had to promise Dr. Innard and his brave staff a great deal, in order to get them to remain at their post in the Pesthouse.

Sir John who had been born in 1625, had married during the early 1650’s, probably shortly before 1653 to Elizabeth Richards, who was the daughter of Sir John Richards, of Yaverland on the Isle of Wight.

Their first child Martha had been born in 1656.  John was born on 27th December 1656, followed by Francis on September 11th 1657, and William on or about October 1658. Sadly his wife had died the following year on 28^th April 1659, and was buried in Saint Paul’s Covent Garden.

As a widower Sir John must have been bringing up his children alone, probably with the aid of servants.  With plague breaking out so close to his home, he must have decided to send his children out to the countryside. Lady Richards who may have been the children's grandmother, took the children to their home at Yaverland on the Isle of Wight.

The islanders, by late August were very aware of the plague in London, and must have been terrified that people arriving from the mainland would bring the plague to the island.  They tried to prevent Lady Richard's crossing the island to her home in Yaverland.

Inhabitants of Yaverland to Sir W. Oglander.

The Humble desire of ye Inhabitants of yaverland August the 30th (65)

Sr
These few lines are to entreate yo^r wor^pp for to send to Bradinge yt they might sett a watch & ward to keepe out all newport people out of the towne wee are resolved to keepe a gard day & night att yarbridge & wee have beene with Major Holmes att the fort & he hath promise that none shall come that way & we doe understand that the Lady Richards is minded to come to Yaverland too morrow but we are resolved for to stop her & not to lett her come in & wee are fearfull if she might come in thorough Brading & soe to come over the wall by ye sluce therefore we thought fitt to acquainte your worshipp with it hopeinge that yo^r worshipp will send to Bradinge that they might secure that way 

[5]

This effort to stop Lady Richard cannot have been successful. 

Over much of Europe there was a tradition of building ornamental columns to celebrate a city or towns deliverance from the Plague.  The Piazza at Covent Garden when it was originally laid out had an empty square.  At some point in the 1630’s a single solitary tree was planted in the centre of the Piazza surrounded by some wooden railings.  In 1668 it was decided by the parishioners that a column be erected to replace the tree which was not growing very well.  A Mr. Tomlinson, who was probably Richard Tomlinson, a churchwarden, proposed the erection of the column.  In 1668 he informed the vestry: -

“that he and his gentlemen had a desire to erect a Doricke columne of polished marble, for the support of a quadrangular dyall in the midst of the railes where now the trees are, it being very improbable that they should ever come to any maturity.” [6]

The Churchwarden’s accounts for 1668-9 record the receipts of gifts “towards the Erecting of the Columne - £20 from the fifth Earl of Bedford, and £10 each from Sir Charles Cotterell, master of ceremonies, and Lord Denzil Holles. 

£90 was paid to “Mr Keizar at the Sculpture of the Pallas for the Columne”, 8s. 6d. to Mr Wainwright for the four gnomons, and £2to Mr. Browne, “the mathematician, for his paines about the dial.”

10s. was paid for “ Drawing A Modell of the Columne to be presented to the Vestry.”

Then the churchwardens accounts go on to record that “Upon due consideration of those many signall services, that the Honorable Sir John Baber hath don this Parish from Time to Time Wee thought it good to affix his Coate of Armes, in one of the Heilds belonging to the Columne, as a Perpetual acknowledgement of our gratitude, and to Refuse any present from him that should be tendered Towards the Charge thereof.” [7]

John Baber had lived in the area from at least 1655.

The following entries in the cover page of the Overseers of the poor record that he was paying contributions for the poor, along with his neighbours.

Handberrye Overseers

For the Poore of the Parrish

Of Convent Garden [8]

Anno Dm

1655

Page 1

Poore of the Parrishe of Convent

Garden Anno Dm 1655.

West Division

Henretta Street

Imprimis
Right Honoble Earles of Bedford	03:00:00	02:10:00	0:10:0
Jerfox Braves	00:17:04	0:17:4
Honoble Lady Wootton	02:00:00	2:0:0
Will Lord Munson	02:00:00	2:0:0
Samuel Cooper	01:00:00	1:0:0
Mary Norfolk	00:10:10	0:10:10
John Jerman	00:10:10	0:10:10
Richard Doe	00:10:10	0:10:10
Abr Soaudebrug	01:00:00	1:0:0
Ralph Snillorke	00:08:08	0:8:0
Hugh Sharpington	00:10:10	0:10:10
John Baber	00:16:00	00:16:00
John Bradshaw	00:10:10	0:10:10
John Share	00:10:10	0:10:10
Edward Wallinger	00:10:10	0:10:10
Solloman Moore	00:06:06	0:6:6
John Staley	00:08:08	0:8:8

Fig. 4. An engraving dating from 1690 showing a bonfire next to the column in the Piazza at Covent Garden [9]

As Sir John did not die until 1704, it is very possible that he saw the events portrayed above in 1690.

He was buried in the St Paul's Church and the family erected a large monument to his memory. Sadly the church was burned out in the 19th Century destroying the interior and the monument.

Fig. 5. John Rocque drew the Piazza in 1742 when

 the monument can still be clearly seen.

Fig. 6. Covent Garden by Samuel Scott showing . Scott lived on the east side

of the piazza until about 1758 when he moved to Twickenham. 

[Click on image for a larger version] 

It is not known when the column finally came down, or what became of it. I don't suppose that anything survives, but it would be fun to find it hidden away like Temple Bar.

If you can add any thing to the information above, I would love to hear from you. I can be contacted at balmer.nicholas@gmail.com

[1] Survey of London, page 79, Covent Garden Churchwarden's Accounts
[2] C.S.P.D. Volume CXCVII paragraph 93
[3] C.S.P.D. Volume CXXXIX 1665-1666 paragraph 68
[4] Source: (OG/89/11) from http://www.btinternet.com/~rob.martin1/bem/plag.htm
[5] See “Survey of London, Volume XXXVI, page 79, and 331, originally from British Library scrapbook
[6] See “Survey of London, Volume XXXVI, page 79, and 331, originally from British Library scrapbook entitled “Gleanings relating to the Parish of Covent Garden Westminster” pressmark 1889 a 20
[7] Covent Garden Churchwardens Accounts, Westminster Records Office.
[8] House of Commons Journal Volume 7: 10 March 1660', Journal of the House of Commons: volume 7: 1651-1660 (1802), pp. 868-71
[9] See Survey of London, volume XXXVI, page xv.  Original is part of the Crace Collection in the British Museum, Views portfolio xviii.
[10]  entitled “Gleanings relating to the Parish of Covent Garden Westminster” pressmark 1889 a 20.

The Invasion of Normandy 1417, the siege of Honfleur

Figure 1: King Philip le Bel's shipyard at Rouen, with a fleet sailing on the Seine in the background. [1]

While searching for accounts in the original chronicles that describe the events of 1417 following the landing at Trouville, I have become aware of an intriguing inconsistency between the English and French accounts of the events that followed the landings.

Having recently visited many of the locations described, it became apparent to me that the English accounts have all overlooked, or played down a three week siege of Honfleur that took place in August 1417.

I believe that this reticence to discuss the siege was a conscious attempt to cover-up, what must have been a serious upset for King Henry and his officers at the time.

The successful defence of the port of Honfleur by the town's Armagnac defenders, may indeed have changed the course of the entire expedition, by forcing King Henry V to reconsider and to change the original objectives of his operations.

This collective overlooking of the events by the English chroniclers, has also I believe concealed a second phase of the naval operations in the Bay of the Seine in August 1417.

Figure 2: Honfleur Customs House, one of the few buildings thought to survive from before 1417.

Almost all the chronicles that refer to the landings in France in 1417, like Monstrelet or Gesta Quinti make only a passing reference to the later naval aspects of the operation following the actual landing in 1417.

In order to understand the strategic dilemmas that were presented to King Henry in 1417 by his possession of Harfleur, I believe that it is crucial to first understand the naval situation, before one can fully comprehend the later progress of the campaign in late August and September 1417.

By the spring of 1416 it had become clear that the capture of Harfleur in 1415 was the only tangible and lasting success that King Henry V could claim for the immense effort that the English had put into his attack on France besides the possession of a number of high profile French captives.

This effort had imposed a heavy burden on his kingdom, both in monetary terms through taxation and the raising of loans, and also from the losses of soldiers experienced at the siege of Harfleur.

Maintaining possession of Harfleur was becoming an increasing serious problem for the King and his advisers, because if the garrison capitulated, even this victory would be lost.

The port was closely blockaded by French forces operating from Montvilliers monastery, and several other nearby fortified villages.  The main French siege headquarters at Montvilliers was located less than four kilometres from the walls at Harfleur.

Due to the critical shortages of supplies inside Harfleur and the tightness of the blockade, the garrison were having to mount raids for supplies into the Pay de Caux, often riding out behind the French positions for  twenty or more kilometres away from their base.

However, by doing so they were running huge risks of being cut off upon their return into the town.

The hinterland controlled by the garrison of Harfleur was far too small to allow the town to be self-sufficient, and in any case, many of the former Norman inhabitants of the town had become refugees, or had died during the siege, leaving insufficient cultivators left to work the land.

If the King lost Harfleur, and there was every prospect of this occurring, it would mean that he would lose face and status by comparison to the French leaders, and this in turn might cause him to vital lose support back in England.

Although France was split by a vicious civil war, the outcome of the struggle between at Armagnacs and the Burgundians was uncertain, and at any moment one or other of the principle protagonists might succeed in overcoming his opponent, and then in combining France’s resources against the far less powerful English kingdom.

The shortage of supplies at Harfleur had become critical during 1416.  Sir John Skidmore and Reginald Courtoys, victuallers, along with others, were dispatched by the governor from Harfleur to the king on 6th April 1416 to bring him word of the towns increasingly desperate situation.[2]

To relieve the situation a major naval expedition had had to be mounted from Southampton under the command of the Duke of Bedford, the King’s brother with which to break the French naval blockade of the port of Harfleur. [3]

The French had had all the advantages in this contest because they had a very good naval base at Honfleur from which to operate from, located almost within sight of the beleaguered garrison at Harfleur just across the estuary, as well as from Rouen about 130km up upstream from where to support any attack on English shipping approaching Harfleur.

The outcome of the battle fought by the Duke of Bedford on the 15^th of August 1416, while nominally an English victory, which had enabled Harfleur to be replenished, had come at a high cost to the English in terms of ships sunk, and men lost.  Out of an English fleet originally believed to have numbered about 300 ships, about 20 ships and 700 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers had been either killed or seriously wounded.[4]

If one re-supply operation had required such a major effort, and had cost so many vessels and men, what would be the recurring cost of the future re-supply operations required to supply the garrison be?

How could he re-supply Harfleur several times every year in the face of what might become a steadily reinforced French naval presence at the mouth of the Seine?

How was the King to prevent his sole symbolic acquisition from falling to the French?

How could he do it without placing such a burden on the English economy and people that they might decide to change the regime?

As Craig Lambert [5] and Ian Friel show in their recent research, the organisation of King Henry V’s fleets both for the Harfleur and Agincourt Campaign in 1415, and also for the 1417 invasion were colossal feats of organisation, and ones that demonstrates that the King had developed an experienced and sophisticated staff, led by Richard Cliderowe and John Everdon, able to mobilise these fleets in the relatively short periods available.

The fleet in 1417 included 256 ships, of which 124 belonged to English owners or to the King.  The others were hired in mainly from the Low Countries.  This fleet was considerably smaller in numerical terms than the one used in 1415 when the King appears to have mobilised between 700 and 750 ships, and was smaller than some of the earlier fleets used by Edward III, whose fleets had numbered from between 300 ships and 450 ships for his Brittany expedition.

The 1417 invasion fleet had approximately 117 Nautical miles (135 miles) across which to sail, and were able to make the crossing in favourable weather in two days.

Lambert shows that the crews required to serve the ships would have exceeded the numbers of soldiers that the ships were transporting, requiring a ratio of approximately 1.2 sailors to each soldier carried.[6]

The average number of soldiers carried will have varied widely depending on the size of the vessel, but by dividing the number of men to be carried by the number of vessels we get an average of 18 to 20 soldiers per ship.

I am unable to find any indication of the numbers of horses that the expedition carried, however evidence collated by Lambert (2017) [7] shows that the numbers of horses carried on other expeditions substantially exceeded the numbers of men.  In 1415 the duke of York had taken 770 horses for a retinue of only 450 men.

Dukes were allowed 50 horses, earls, 24, barons 16, knights 6, esquires 4 and archers 1.  So that despite the fact that most of the soldiers would fight on foot, many had ponies to give them strategic mobility, and to carry supplies, equipment and things like tents for the most senior individuals.

The numbers of horses carried per ship depended on the size of ship, but seems to have ranged from 28 or 30, with 51 on one particularly large ship.  The Chronicles also state that in August 1417 the army had substantial quantities of siege engines like Sows [8], as well as cannon, all of which would need carrying across to France.

Although there were over 200 recognised ports around England in the medieval period, the ships in 1417 came from only 50 of these ports, situated along the south coast and as far north as the Humber. 

These ports included small fishing villages like Cromer, Sheringham, Wells-next-the Sea and Thornham.

The average size of English vessel used was only about 78 tonnes, while the average size for the hired in foreign vessels was surprisingly even lower at only 57 tons.

It appears that although there were larger English merchant vessels ranging between 200 and 300 tonnes in burden available that undertook important wine trade to Bordeaux, it appears that these ships were not taken up for service.  Lambert argues that this may have been to avoid disrupting the trade which brought in desperately needed monies from import duties for the Exchequer, and also to avoid potential for political issues with the powerful City merchant interests.

The mouth of the Seine has a complex set of shallow sand bars at its mouth, and as it was the King’s intention to land on open beaches, or to penetrate into the mouth of the river Seine, it would have made good sense to use smaller shallow draft ships, crewed by men accustomed to landing onto exposed open beaches, like those from North Norfolk, rather than it would be to risk larger cargo ships.

The account of the landing at Trouville in my earlier blog post is based on Monstrelet’s Chronicle, which is written from a Burgundian point of view, and by an author located at a considerable distance from the events it was describing.

There are several other chronicles which describe these events from both the English and French points of view.  It is really interesting to compare and contrast their accounts which are written with a view to promoting their patron’s status and to appeal to their partisan potential readers point of view.

The following account comes from an early English translation of Titus Livius chronicle Vita Henrici Quiniti, made into English from the original Latin in 1513, which gives us a description of these events from an English point of view. [9]

Because his journey shoulde not be knowne to his enemies nor where he intended to arive, the Kinge kept his purpose secret from his companie, except that to such persons as was his pleasure he disclosed his councell. And for that cause he had commaunded that all the rest of his nauy should followe those two shipps Royall, whithersoeuer they woulde sayle.

To all the nauy it pleased God to send a good and plesaunt lo winde, vntill the first day of August they all arryued in Normandy, not farr from the Castell of Tonque. Then the watches and guardes of the sea banks, and of the havens of that cuntry, at the first perceauinge so greate an navye, whose streinght they knewe themselues not able to resist, left there stations and fledd to saue theire lyues.

The Kinge w^th all his companie arriued and tooke land, where at his first landinge he dubbed 48 knights of his hoast, such as were able and worthie of that order; and that done he ordered to be pro- claymed all those ordynaunces and edicts that were published tofore the besieginge of Harefleet, and also diuers other such as he thought to be good and proffitable for his hoast. Not farr from the sea banke where he landed were smale and ruynate howses, wherein the Kinge wth diuers other his most familliar and his householde seruants were lodged for that night. And the residue of his hoast were lodged in there tents & pavillions. And when all the shipps were vnladen and discharged of theire carriage he sent againe all the navy into England, except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of warr.

And except also such shipps as the Kinge had assigned to the Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiett.

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur] and of other Castells, Townes and Citties nighe vnto those parts; w^th gentlemen, w^th manie prisoners and greate prayes of beastes, returned to the hoast in euerie thinge satisfied the Kings mynde, for as much as was there charge. There enemies assured of there comminge in so greate a number were all stricken w"" feare, everie man of them for himselfe conveyed there stufe, there beasts, theire graynes, and all other goods into Citties, Castells, and Townes, lo not knowinge whome the Kinge woulde first assiege. Then they prepared there holds, they strenghtened there Townes and walls w^th stones and gunns and other things necessarie.

The account fits well with that written by Monstrelet, but adds several intriguing details.  It describes the French coast watching organisation, and how the watchers fled, quite understandably given the scale of the fleet that was arriving on the tide.  The villagers at Trouville, evidently caught the sense of panic, and fled in turn, leaving their houses to their fate.

In the last paragraph, there is a good description of the King sending off reconnaissance parties towards Honfleur, and the other nearby castles.

Note also how “except such shipps as were deputed for the carriage of gunns and other engines and habiliments of war” and the “Earle of Marche readily manned and apparrelled to kepe the sea peaceably and quiet.”

History is written by the victors, and the victors will always attempt to overlook their setbacks and failures, and enhance their victories.

English accounts set out a timeline starting with the landing, followed by the capture of Bonneville, and then moving on directly to the capture of Auvillars, and then the siege of Caen.

It is when you turn to the French accounts of events, that a curious fact emerges.

There was a three-week siege of Honfleur by the English, and one which was unsuccessful, between the landing and the start of the attack on Caen, which does not get mentioned by the English historians.

The Chronicle of Saint Denys, contains the following description of the landing, and describes the landing operation, and the events of the first week in August as follows.  Like many Medieval Chroniclers, they wildly over estimate the size of the opposing army, however they understand the crucial importance of the control of the river ports on the Seine.

Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI,

“The King of England, delighted at the success [of his navy] which opened the entrance to Normandy, and considering himself already assured of the conquest of the country, embarked with all the forces of his kingdom, and fifty thousand archers, and arrived without obstruction, in the month of August, in view of Harfleur, the most important of the gates of all the duchy, which sends ships to all parts of the world.  The approach of the most violent storm would not have produced a greater terror than that which the arrival of the enemy spread over all the coasts of Normandy.

Everyone thought only of taking refuge in the strongest fortified places, as if to avoid the effects of the attack. The inhabitants of Toucques withdrew and abandoned their town to the King of England.

The prince thought then that it would be useful for him to have carefully guard the mouth of the Seine, by which every day passed all of the goods which were transported to Rouen and from Rouen to Paris, and that this would facilitate his army to have the means of roaming freely and ravaging the countries on either side of the river; consequently, he gave orders to attack Honfleur, a considerable port situated on the left bank. [10]”

Those who governed the state in concert with the Comte d'Armagnac, constable of France, had foreseen this attack. They had also been careful to supply food and all kinds of defensive weapons to this town, which was besides surrounded by solid walls and a wide and deep ditch; In addition, there was a good garrison under the direction of an illustrious Norman knight named Betas de Harneville.

These brave men, summoned to surrender, not only refused to do so, as they had so often made between them, but they resolved by common accord to resist valiantly until death.

After vainly trying to shake their resolution by insinuate and exhortations and by the promises of perpetual franchises, the King of England ordered his men of war and his archers to begin the siege of the city.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. While they ran freely through the country without encountering resistance, the King of England sent messengers of peace to Bayeux, to Evreux, and to the other most important cities, to induce them to surrender, promising to confirm the old franchises of the inhabitants, so that they might, like their ancestors, taste the sweetness of repose and ease. These attempts were unsuccessful.

Wishing, however, to announce his expedition by some feat, he resolved to seize the town of Caen, the most important in Normandy after Rouen, renowned for its numerous population and the wealth of its commerce, and vowed not to let go that he would not have mastered it.

The French believed Honfleur to be a very strong town, knowing that it was furnished with arms and provisions of all kinds, surrounded by thick walls and large towers, and defended by a castle of great extent and almost impregnable. [11]

As far as I am aware, there are no earlier maps of Honfleur available than this map produced in 1656 by Jacques Gomboust. It shows the town as it was before the major redevelopment that took place between 1665 and 1685 when the two large basins were dug that such an attraction to tourists today. One of which largely removed a complete district of the Medieval town. (Dufau 2014)[12]

Figure 3: Honfleur in 1656. Courtesy of Gallica.

Although the walls shown in the 1656 plan have been greatly strengthened after 1417, following the serious sieges of the town that took place during the Wars of Religion in the 1560's and 1590's by the addition of two major Italianate bastions to the south of the town, it is still possible to make out some of the Medieval walls and towers in the plan that must have faced the English in 1417, buried inside the later walls.

The town in 1417 with its walls and towers was remarkably compact (approximately 280 x 195m), and in many ways it is closer in size to a castle, rather than a walled town. 

It was garrisoned by a highly experienced contingent under Betas de Harneville made up of many men who had experience of warfare at sea where even routine voyages could all too quickly turn violent. Until the landing their role had been to blockade Harfleur on a daily basis.

As described in Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys, the Constable of France had already had the opportunity to stock up the town with supplies.

Modern authors describe the landing at Torques and comment on the speed with which it was effected.

They believe that it took only a single day to land the forces, unlike the three or more days that it took to land in 1415 for the Harfleur operation.

I believe that this understanding is incorrect and needs reconsidering.

The 1415 landing had been made onto a rocky beach situated at the base of steep cliffs. The army had landed its siege equipment, onto this beach, and then had to struggled for several to get it up the escarpment and over the hills that overlook Harfleur.

The beach at Torques, although shallow is situated on a lee shore, and any shipping in the bay in the event of rough weather would have been at risk of becoming stranded.

I believe that the reason that the landing in 1417 only took one day, was not because it was a much more efficient landing than in 1415, but was because the King only landed his men and horses. Most of the supplies and a large proportion of the siege equipment remained on the shipping.

The reason for this was that King's aim was first to secure the hinterland inland of Honfleur with the aim of cutting the town off from support so that he could capture it from land.

To do this he planned to pass the shipping laden with the cannon and other siege equipment into the mouth of the Seine where they could be used to achieve his two objectives.

The first objective was to neutralise or capture Honfleur, and the second was to simultaneously to pass supplies into the beleaguered Harfleur.

Following the Trouville landing Titus Livius tells us..

And that done the Kinge sent noble men of armes and horsebacke to espie the situacion and streinght of the castell of Humplewe [Honfleur]

I believe that it is possible to work out the likely direction of these reconnaissance operations.

Figure 4. Conjectural naval operations in support of the siege of Honfleur in August 1417. Please click on image for larger version. [13]

As can be seen from Figure 4, Bonneville castle and Honfleur were located at either end of a large block of woodland.  These woods are situated on top of a ridge composed of blocky chalk, which is overlain with glacial clays.  This has resulted in a very unstable headland along the seashore, that frequently slumps to this day.  There is evidence however that a track ran along the tops of the bluffs and headland towards Honfleur.  I believe that this was the track used by the English scouts.

The woods were away to the east.  Once the scouts had arrived at the outskirts of Honfleur, they would have been able to summon the town, and to commence the blockading in preparation for the siege.  By the morning of the 3rd of August, the castle of Bonneville sur Toucques had started to negotiate for its surrender. The garrison had agreed that if the castle was not relieved by the 9th of August that it would surrender.

With his bridgehead secured, King Henry V was able to move his guns and other siege engines towards Honfleur, by coasting his fleet along the shore following a route parallel to that previously taken by his scouts.  In the event that any of the French naval vessels inside Honfleur, or from the base at Rouen arrived, the English would be behind the sandbanks in the mouth of the River Seine.

Scouts placed on top of the river bluffs would also be able to warn of any approaching force.

Figure 5. Modern Google Earth Image showing 1, the extent of medieval Honfleur, 2, the approximate High Tide line, 3, the approx Low Tide line, 4, the beach used to land the siege equipment

It is not clear if the King originally planned just a blockade, or if it was intended to capture Honfleur.

From the following text in Sant Denys, it looks as if they intended at first to capture the town.

For several days vigorous assaults were delivered against the city, and the besieged defended themselves with courage. They even had the boldness to make several clandestine sorties against the besiegers; they also threw from the top of the walls all kinds of projectiles, and killed some of the principal officers of the enemy's army.  The English finally grew tired, and seeing themselves frustrated in their hopes, they raised the siege and penetrated into the heart of Normandy. 

However, after several days of vigorous assaults and bloody repulses, the King may have begun to realise that he was running the risk of a re-run of the protracted 1415 siege of Harfleur.

With the garrison fighting for its very existence during the siege, and cannon very probably located on the sea shore within range of the mouth of the anchorage of the remaining French warships at Honfleur, the French were unable to interfere with the passing of supplies into Harfleur.  It is not known how many ships entered the river to Harfleur, or indeed how much food they were able to pass to the garrison, but it is clear that the King no longer had cause for concern over the situation at Harfleur for the following winter.

The King had dispatched scouts not just towards Honfleur, but also towards Dives sur Mer, Lisieux and also Auvillars.

These scouts probably had a number of functions to perform. Their principle role was to give the King early warning of the approach of any French relief force that might disrupt his siege operations, but they would also be tasked with driving in any cattle, sheep or pigs and horses that they could secure.

Over the first couple of weeks of August the scouts evidently moved fast, and across a wide swath of Normandy, and their approach caused panic amongst the local population, who seen to have been ill prepared to defend themselves against the English.  I will explore these operations in more detail in my next blog.

We don't know the exact dates of the siege of Honfleur, however it is believed to have lasted three weeks. If, as seems likely, it started by the 3rd of August 1417, it was probably abandoned on or about the 24th of August.

I believe it was the reports that the King was receiving from his scouts that caused him to rapidly reconsider his entire strategy during the period between about the 15th of August and the 21st of August.  The scouts reports were that cities like Lisieux were being abandoned at their approach, and that many smaller castles were surrendering on first summons.  It was becoming clear that the Armagnac parts of France were in no real position to resist his army, if he could move fast enough.

He was gambling that he could secure a large enough city and region before the French could recover from their surprise and unpreparedness, and mobilise forces with which to counterattack him.

In 1415, when the King had left Harfleur for Calais, the French had sunk their differences very quickly, and forces had very quickly been moved to prevent his movement across the river Somme.

He must have appreciated by just how tight a margin he and his battered army had survived the events at Agincourt in 1415.

It was unlikely that he could repeat the march to Calais in 1417, as besides the rivers he had crossed in 1415, he would have also had the Seine to cross. His army in 1417 was smaller than that in 1415, which suggests that he had a smaller operation in mind when he had planned his operations in the Spring of 1417, than the one he had fought in 1415.

With Honfleur unlikely to fall quickly, King Henry faced several dilemmas. Much of his army would wish to return to England by winter, and he had no port secured from which to re-embark his forces.

Needed to capture a port and a town or region large enough to give him security in France, so that he could retreat if necessary.

The ports at the mouth of the River Dives to the east of Caen were the only option open to him, unless he could capture Caen itself.

With reports reaching him from his scouts that told him of his enemies unpreparedness, he began to realise that he had  a fleeting opportunity to capture Caen.

I believe that with Harfleur replenished for another winter, and Honfleur resisting fiercely, this is why he abandoned his siege of the town, which was not to fall into English hands until 1419.

Sadly the accounts of these events in the Chronicle's fail to mention any of ordinary men's  experiences.

However, John Nowell, as an archer may well have spent time in the trenches surrounding Honfleur.

He must have wondered at the cannon that were firing into the town with so much violence and noise.

Machines were erected around the walls, which were supposed to throw enormous stones with noise, seeming like that of thunder, and with a frightful assassination as if they had been vomited by hell.

Robert, as a household servant of Richard Beauchamp presumably had a more comfortable existence at the siege, perhaps living under a flap at the rear of his masters tent.

[1] http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=39341
http://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/battle-seine-henry-vs-unknown-naval-triumph/

[2] Jonathan Sumption. Cursed Kings, The Hundred Wars War IV, page 498-499.
[3] Ian Friel (2017) Henry V's Navy, 39-40. 126-138.

[4]Craig Lambert (2017) Henry V and the crossing to France: reconstructing naval operations for the Agincourt campaign, 1415, Journal of Medieval History, 43:1, 24-39’ DOI: 10.1080/03044181.2016.1236503

[5]Lambert (2017) page 25.

[6] Lambert (2017) page 37.
[7] Lambert (2017) pages 37-38.

[8] Sows, a covered hut on wheels used as a siege engine, which could be used to protect miners as they attempted to reach the base of the castle walls, or a gate. Often covered in leather to protect against fire arrows, or burning items being thrown down onto the sow as it advanced.

[9] Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, editor, The First English Life of King Henry the Fifth written in 1513 by an anonymous Author known commonly as The Translator of Livius

[10] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, volume 2. Page 101 and 102.

[11] Chronique du religieux de Sant Denys volume 2. Page 102 and 103.

[12] Dufau, B. 2014, Evolution du Port de Honfleur, see  http://le-vieux-honfleur.fr/photos/files/Contributions/Evolution_du_Port_de_Honfleur.pdf
[13] Based on a Cassini map dating from circa 1750, from the Dave Romsey collection.  L'Havre has been removed.  The off-shore sandbanks may have been in different locations, and the channel of the Seine has moved a great deal since 1417, when it is known to have flowed much closer to the walls of Honfleur than it does today.